Treasury security
The multisig treasury is the organization's shared USDC account, from which admins refill the agent wallets. No agent can reach it, and its transfers do not go through an agent wallet's spending policy: they are authorized by the signatures of its human signers alone.
How it is secured
- The threshold is a number of signers. A transfer needs a set number of signatures out of the signers, with no weighting. The contract enforces it on the blockchain and verifies each signature there.
- Each signer's key is a passkey. It is created on the signer's own phone in the Keyban Signer app and kept by the phone's passkey manager, iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager, which can sync it to the person's other devices. The passkey is the signer's key in the treasury contract: Keyban does not hold it. The phone asks for Face ID or a fingerprint before it signs, and the contract refuses a passkey signature that does not carry that user verification.
- What you see is what you sign. Before it asks for the passkey, the phone recomputes the transfer, or the change to the signers, from what it shows, and refuses to sign if the result differs from what the server sent.
- Only the signers change the signers. Adding or removing a signer and changing the threshold need the approval of the threshold of current signers, on their phones. Keyban relays the approved change to the blockchain.
- Keyban relays, and cannot forge a signer's signature. The signed transfer reaches the blockchain through Keyban's relayer, the same way as an agent wallet's transfers.
What the key checks protect
A new key is admitted only after a colleague checks it over a phone call. At creation, once every invited signer has a key, Keyban draws who checks whom, so that nobody checks their own key. When a signer is added later, each signer who approves the addition calls the newcomer. Every check works the same way: the colleague calls on a number they already knew, the newcomer's phone shows a 4-digit code derived from their key, and the colleague compares it on their own phone. The checks defend against:
- A compromised dashboard that presents a key nobody holds: a substituted key produces a code that does not match the one on the newcomer's phone.
- Human error: a colleague who was not expecting the call stops.
They do not defend against the quorum itself: enough signers to reach the threshold can change anything, by design. Keep more signers than the threshold, and treat every change as a real event. Every Owner and Admin of the organization is told when a key is admitted, and every signer when a key is replaced.
What Keyban can and cannot do
Keyban relays the signed transfers and the signed changes to the blockchain. It holds no key of the treasury, so it cannot sign a transfer or a change of signers in their place. The one place Keyban takes part in the signers is the recovery of a treasury without margin, below: there its confirmation is required, and never enough on its own.
Keyban keeps one power over the contract: its admin key can upgrade the treasury contract, and an upgrade can change any of its rules. Every upgrade is public on the blockchain, and Keyban upgrades its contracts only through the automated gates described in Platform security. The Security model states what this leaves uncovered.
Recovery
Passkeys synchronize with the person's account, so the ordinary case, a lost or replaced phone, needs nothing: the passkey reappears on the next device signed in to the same iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager account. Recovery exists for the other cases, from the Keyban Signer app:
| Situation | Resolution |
|---|---|
| Lost or replaced phone, same ecosystem | Nothing: the synced passkey follows the account. |
| New phone, the old one still in hand, including a move between iOS and Android | Change phone: the key moves to the new phone in two scans. The signer does it alone, at most once a day, and the other signers are told. |
| Lost key, in a treasury with more signers than the threshold | Request a new key from the new phone. The threshold of colleagues each call the signer, compare the code of the new key and approve. |
| Lost key, in a treasury without margin | The same request, approved by one colleague in a 2-of-2 and by two otherwise, then confirmed by Keyban. See below. |
| A signer who leaves, or a hostile signer | An admin proposes their removal from the dashboard, and the threshold of signers approves it. |
A session opened by Keyban's support never counts for a recovery, and the accounts of signers cannot sign in by SMS.
Treasuries without margin
A treasury whose threshold equals its number of signers, 2 of 2 for example, has no spare signer: once a key is lost, no transfer can reach the threshold. Such a treasury is allowed only if every signer accepts a warning in the Keyban Signer app when they create their key. Its recovery needs Keyban's confirmation, which Keyban gives only for a request opened by the key's owner, in their own session, and at most once every 30 days per treasury. The warning states both sides: recovery relies on Keyban, on the owner's e-mail account and on a colleague, and whoever controls a signer's e-mail account and convinces a colleague can take that signer's seat.
Related
- Security model: what the design defends against, and what it does not cover.
- Multisig treasury: what the treasury is and who controls it.
- Run the treasury: creating a treasury, changing its signers and signing its transfers.